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Abstract  
The paper investigates the main macro-political trends 
at the international level. After reviewing the conceptual 
maps of international politics and the various future 
scenarios for globalisation, the paper examines the three 
main world order arrangements that could emerge in the 
coming decades. These are derived from the current 
distribution of power at the international level and from 
current trends, and are extrapolated as possible future 
developments. These eventualities involve the four major 
powers in the world to come: China, the European Union, 
Russia, and the US. 
The international system will most likely pivot on the 
interaction between the declining hegemon, the US, and the 
emerging power, China. It is with reference to such 
interaction that we need to envisage possible future world 
orders. It is clear that the other remaining powers, not to 
mention other countries, will have to strategically adapt to 
the behaviour of these two superpowers. 
Many see the relative decline of the US and the growth 
of China as setting the two on a collision course. It is 
difficult to predict whether a real armed conflict will occur 
between the two superpowers. There are significant 
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balancing dynamics between the two countries; first and 
foremost is their economic interdependence. What can be 
affirmed more easily is that there will be a continuous, if not 
growing, tension between the two. As outcomes of this 
tension, three main scenarios of world order can be drawn.  
World Order One: The West vs. the Rest. In this 
scenario, tension remains a central feature, which polarises 
the world in a new bipolar system. The EU is pulled 
towards, and even more greatly integrated within, the 
transatlantic community, while Russia follows a similar 
trajectory within a Sino-centric Asian community.  
World Order Two: Eurasian Integration and US 
Solitude. In this scenario, a process of inter-regional 
integration is promoted by China and accepted by both 
Russia and the EU. The Eurasian mass is progressively 
integrated within the largest economic area in the world. 
All other regional aggregations suffer a strong pull effect. 
The US and the American continent at large goes adrift in 
geopolitical solitude, generating inward-looking isolationist 
stances.  
World Order Three: Enlarged West vs. China. In this 
scenario, the West remains predominant, China is more 
and more isolated, and Russia is pulled back towards 
Europe and the larger transatlantic community.  
In the last part of the paper, the implications of the 
three scenarios drawn concern for East Asia. 
 
Keywords : World Order, USA, RPC, EU, Russia, IR, 
Globalization, Multicentrism 
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1.1 Theories of  international order 
A classical understanding of international order sees it as a 
system of settled expectations (Bull, 1977). In Bull’s view, order 
has little in common with the notion of justice. It is, exclusively, a 
set of mechanisms that enable a group to interact smoothly. Of 
course, the mechanisms that generate these settled expectations 
vary depending on the specific circumstances of the political group 
in question. At the international level, a number of different order-
generating mechanisms have been identified in line with major 
theoretical perspectives. While realists tend to find the origins of 
such mechanisms in the mere distribution of power, liberals 
include the added value of the institutional framework as a 
mitigating factor, and constructivists point to inter-subjective 
constructions in terms of shared understandings. 
Realists identify two key mechanisms generating stability in 
the system: the balance of power and hegemonic stability. 
Whereas the first entails a balanced distribution of power (Waltz 
1979), the second identifies the source of international stability in 
an uneven distribution of power, balanced in favour of the 
hegemon (Gilpin, 1987). Liberals identify the following three 
elements as key mechanisms for stability in the international 
system: democratic peace, through which the spread of democracy 
decreases the likelihood of war (Doyle, 1986); complex 
interdependence, through which the increase in international and 
transnational exchanges brings about stability (Keohane & Nye, 
1977); and finally, institutionalism, through which the creation of 
common institutions yields the promise of stability because it 
distributes the payoffs of reduced transaction costs and increased 
chances of cooperation due to the presence of a common authority 
able to solve conflicts and impose sanctions (Keohane, 1984). 
Constructivists provide a twofold reading of current reality. On 
one hand, they see the consolidation of common narratives, shared 
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principles, and ultimately, individual mindsets, caused by 
processes of transnational homogenisation, the key order-
generating mechanism in an age of global politics (Wendt, 2003). 
On the other hand, however, they also take into account the 
endlessly competitive nature of (international) politics. In the 
same way, they also point to the continuous competition for 
legitimacy in the world order, especially in times of (re)emerging 
powers and increased assertiveness by non-Western powers. 
The debate on world order in the second half of the twentieth 
century and the beginning of the twenty-first has been driven by 
these different theoretical underpinnings. The current debate on 
world order re-emerged with the end of the Cold War. However, 
the discussion had not been abandoned during that period. There 
were interesting contributions, but they remained on the fringe of 
the political and academic debate (Cox, 1987; Falk & Mendlovitz, 
1966). An influential exception was the classic work by Bull (Bull, 
1977) and later, the study by Suganami (Suganami, 1989), which 
opened up the subsequent debate in the 1990s. The post-Cold War 
debate in the 1990s was lively. It centred on the growing 
phenomenon of global governance (Archibugi & Held, 1995; 
Czempiel & Rosenau, 1992; Slaughter, 1997) and its alternatives 
(Huntington 1996). With the new millennium, 9/11, and an 
increasingly evident power shift, the debate intensified towards 
the present day (Bremmer & Roubini, 2011; Buzan, 2011; Fabbrini 
& Marchetti, 2017; Ikenberry, 2011; Khanna, 2011; Kupchan, 
2012). 
We must add that since the beginning of the 2000s, IR theory 
in general, and debates of world order in particular, have been 
confronted by what could be defined as a ‘non-Western turn’ in 
global politics. This means scholars from non-Western countries 
and what was once called the ‘Third World’, repeatedly called for a 
growing inclusion coming from non-Western realities about IR 
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theorizing. In this stance, they recognize the fact that the 
dichotomy between the “West” and “the Rest” has always been 
problematic. However, such scholars believe that to talk about a 
‘Global IR’ still rests among one of the greatest challenges of IR to 
truly become a global discipline. Even more, they argue that to 
recognize the place or contribution for the world order of the non-
Western countries is not the same as to recognize their positive 
agency, that is, seeing them as active ‘subjects’ rather than passive 
‘objects’ in international politics (Acharya 2018). In this light, 
‘pluralism’ is also often considered as the missing link between 
Western and non-Western academia, but IR scholars should 
become aware that it represents the only way to legitimize the 
production of systemic knowledge of IR theories (Qin 2018). 
 
1.2 Powershift : from the cold war to multicentrism 
Today, the debate on world order is intense (Marchetti, 2016). 
As is always the case in moments of transition, the global 
restructuring of international affairs is generating profound 
reflection on how the world is being, and should be, re-organised. 
After the long period of the Cold War and the following decade 
marked by American unipolarism, the world has entered the new 
millennium amid major shifts. 
The relative decline of the US, the crisis of the EU, the 
consolidation of the BRIC countries, and the diffusion of power to 
non-state actors all constitute significant demands for a new 
conceptualisation of the rules of the global game. The US has 
emerged from its unipolar period rather weakened. Economically 
downgraded, wounded by 9/11, and diplomatically debilitated by 
multiple failures, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and 
Ukraine, but the US still retains a degree of global leadership. The 
EU, after a period of ambitious self-promotion, is now at a serious 
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impasse. The economic crisis has generated political weakening. 
Internally, the once solid liberal consensus has opened up to a 
much more pluralist debate within the EU, but this has also 
allowed populist parties to become significant actors in European 
politics. Externally, the EU is unable to address crises both to its 
east and south. In the BRIC camp, China is increasing its 
economic, military, and political power. Brazil and India are 
reaffirming their regional, quasi-global, power. Russia is proving 
an obstacle to many Western projects. The Islamic world is in 
turmoil, with the Sunni-Shia cleavage dividing numerous 
countries and generating regional instability. Finally, globalisation 
has generated abundant opportunities for non-state actors to play 
a significant role in international affairs. From classic 
intergovernmental organisations to standard-setting bodies, 
international non-governmental organisations to multinational 
corporations, criminal organisations to terrorist networks, the 
world seems a level playing field for these non-state actors. 
With the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, the world entered a period of unmatched unipolarism that 
lasted for almost two decades and was marked by growing global 
integration. The 1990s began with the first Gulf War and were 
later shaped incisively by the two Clinton presidential terms. A 
number of significant events occurred in this decade, including the 
war in Yugoslavia (1991-5) on the security front, the creation of 
the WTO (1995) with Chinese membership in 2001 on the 
economic front, and Russian membership of the Council of Europe 
on the political front. All in all, the world moved clearly towards 
global integration under uncontested American leadership. From 
2001 on, however, the path of global integration came into 
question. Most acutely, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 posed a 
challenge to unrivalled American leadership. In a very different 
form, but equally challenging, was the creation of the World Social 
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Forum in Brazil as a place of radical contestation from below. 
Under George W. Bush, the US entered into two conflicts in 
Afghanistan (from 2001) and Iraq (from 2003), both of which 
remain open and have generated numerous controversies. On a 
more institutional note, the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization in 2001 marked the first major institutional 
divergence from the universal multilateralism led by the West 
which dominated the 1990s. 
2008 can arguably be considered a turning point for the 
international system. A systematic change seems to have begun in 
2008 which is slowly pushing the world order towards a more 
multipolar or multicentric model. The American economic crisis, 
which began in 2007 but erupted in 2008 with the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy, weakened US status at the international 
level. The EU followed a similar pattern a few years later. 
Precisely when the West was experiencing these moments of 
weakness, a number of other major powers became more assertive 
and confrontational towards the Western international system 
that had dominated the scene after 1989. As a consequence of the 
crisis, in 2008, the first G20 heads of state meeting was organised 
in Washington with the intention of tackling the economic crisis by 
bringing in the emerging economies. The G8 was no longer seen as 
an adequate means of properly addressing this major instability. 
In the same year as this institutional revolution, the (re)emerging 
powers asserted their role in world politics in other ways too. 
Russia intervened militarily in Georgia to reassert its influence in 
its immediate region. China organised the Olympic Games in 
Beijing to assert its return to the world stage. 
The world after 2008 looks like a world in which the project for 
single global integration in political, economic, and security terms 
is ever further away, and instead, regional fragmentation and 
West vs. BRIC tension has been accentuated. Regional blocs 
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increasingly seem to be in competition: the Eurasian Customs 
Union was created in 2010 as a barrier to the European Union’s 
power of attraction and as a further response to the flashpoints in 
Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia. Inter-regional trade agreements 
were signed (TTP, 2015) and are being negotiated (TTIP) as a 
substitute for the multilateral WTO rounds and as a way of re-
establishing Western leadership by systematically excluding the 
BRICs from the negotiating table. New financial institutions were 
created—the New Development Bank (formerly, the BRICS 
Development Bank) in 2014, and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank in 2015—which alter the US-centrism of the 
world economy. Finally, huge infrastructure projects such as the 
Chinese One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR) aim to connect the 
entire Eurasian region within a single platform while excluding 
the US. 
In this pluralist and changing context, a number of different 
scenarios are materialising. A summary of the various scenarios is 
provided by Joseph Nye, using a chessboard metaphor. According 
to Nye, the best way to think about international politics is to 
conceive of it as being played simultaneously on three chessboards. 
On the first chessboard, the military one, the system is unipolar, 
with the US firmly ahead of its rivals. On the second chessboard, 
the economic one, the system is multipolar, with the US this time 
having to share power with the EU, China, and the other big 
economic powers. Finally, on the third chessboard, the mixed one, 
the system is a-polar, with power spread on a transnational scale. 
On this last chessboard, the players are many and among the 
great powers, only the US and the EU have the necessary skills to 
influence the game, thanks to their ability to forge synergies with 
non-governmental actors (Nye, 2004). 
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1.3 Maps and models of international politics 
Our mental map of international politics tends to see the globe 
as a jigsaw puzzle composed of around 200 tiles. To be more 
precise, we conceptualise the world as comprised of 194 states, the 
official members of the United Nations. From this point of view, in 
order to understand international politics we have to observe the 
behaviour of the states, which we take as the international 
system’s unit of analysis. This state-centric worldview derives from 
the Westphalian system and the intellectual dominance of realism. 
Throughout history, however, the perception of the international 
system’s nature has not always been like this. Before the 
Westphalian system, the world was seen as divided between large 
supranational empires with history as the product of their 
interaction. During the Cold War, the mental map of international 
politics was essentially based on only two tiles, the two blocks, 
capitalist and socialist, with Washington and Moscow as capitals, 
plus the ‘third world’ of non-aligned countries which had a truly 
marginal position. 
From the 1980s until the 2008 financial crisis, many 
commentators argued the global jigsaw had eight pieces, the 
member states of the G8. The global north, ‘the West’, no longer 
guided the world by colonial control but through economic 
leadership. More recently we have come to realise that those eight 
states are no longer able to govern the world alone and as a 
consequence, the map has been widened to include a number of 
countries in the global south, primarily the so-called emerging 
powers. The meetings of the G20 have institutionalised this 
geostrategic enlargement. 
Since the 1990s, Samuel Huntington has argued, however, that 
the real jigsaw of world politics is not made up of 194 pieces, or 
even two, eight, or 20 pieces, but rather has nine macro pieces 
which he calls civilisations (Huntington, 1996). Accordingly, 
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history today is decided by the interaction of nine macro-regional 
areas: 1) a Western area, which includes North America (without 
Mexico), Western Europe, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, 
and Papua New-Guinea; 2) an Orthodox area, which runs from 
Greece to Russia, taking in Kazakhstan and Bosnia-Herzegovina; 
3) an Islamic area, stretching from Morocco to Indonesia, passing 
through Albania, including Sunnis and Shiites, but without a lead 
country; 4) an African area, including all the sub-Saharan 
countries; 5) Latin America, from Argentina to Mexico; 6) a Hindu 
area, centred on India; 7) a Sinic area, centred on China, excluding 
Tibet but including Vietnam and the entire Korean peninsula;  8) 
a Buddhist area, with  Tibet, Mongolia, and other countries in 
Southeast Asia; and finally, 9) Japan on its own. 
The outlines presented above are linked to a number of models 
for the international system that suggest different distributions of 
power. A classic model—in the terms of the last twenty years at 
least—is that of American unipolarism, by which the world 
continues to be led by the US as the unchallengeable military, 
economic, and thus political power. This kind of interpretation 
represents a traditional and widely held view across the US 
government. According to this perspective, the US is destined to 
guide the rest of the world, given its exceptional nature as the 
‘shining city upon a hill’, which gives it a role of responsibility 
towards the rest of the international community. We find this 
vision embedded among both Republican (Bush, 2002) and 
Democrat (Obama, 2007) readings of US world leadership, but it 
also widespread among scholars (Kagan, 1998; Krauthammer, 
2003) and found in many official documents (Department of 
Defense, 2012). 
A second much-discussed model is the so-called G2, between 
the US and China, whereby the two superpowers confront each 
other in an atmosphere of increasing rivalry and the destiny of the 
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international community depends on the resolution of this 
competition. According to the most accredited data, in aggregate 
terms the Chinese economy is destined to become the largest in 
the world, having already surpassed the Japanese economy in 
2010. The US, after a long period of global economic primacy, is 
thus doomed to relinquish the top position in favour of the 
(re)emerging power, China, which accounts for around 23% of 
global GDP, exactly the position it had before European colonial 
expansion. According to American liberals, this change in 
economic leadership will not destabilise the international system 
because existing international institutions are sufficiently robust 
to face the change while forcing the new leader to accept the 
current rules (Ikenberry 2011). American realists, however, think 
the United States will continue to be the hegemon, but if it did 
decline that the international system as we know it would change 
radically, insofar as it is the byproduct of power distribution 
(Kagan 2012). From the G2’s perspective, much will depend on the 
kind of relationship that will be established between the US and 
China, be it cooperative and win-win, or competitive and zero-sum. 
A third model is a tripolar system led either by the US, the EU, 
and China, economically, or by the US, China, and Russia 
militarily. From this perspective, the logic of the old US-EU-Japan 
triad would see China take the Asian role, but would remain 
substantially unaltered, with most of the world’s economic and 
political interactions taking place among the three macro-regions, 
with their imperialistic features (Khanna 2008). In military terms, 
the EU would be submerged within the transatlantic alliance and 
make way for Russia as the third key pillar in the triad. 
A much-discussed model is that of a multipolar world in which, 
alongside the US and the EU, emerging economies consolidate 
their position, especially the BRIC countries, i.e., Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China, with the addition of South Africa. Other 
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countries with considerable economic weight could also exert 
influence, such as the MIKTA countries: Mexico, Indonesia, South 
Korea, Turkey, and Australia. In this model, the world is moving 
towards a roughly balanced, if unprecedented, model of power, 
because for the first time for several centuries, Western countries 
will have to share power with other countries from the global 
south. 
There is then a fifth model: the a-polar world (Avant, 
Finnemore, & Sell, 2010; Haass, 2008; Hale & Held, 2011; Khanna, 
2011, Marchetti, 2009). This is a world in which power is spread 
between multiple players, included non-governmental actors. This 
is a world strongly molded by globalisation, a model that rejects 
realist state-centric exclusivity. From this point of view, the best 
conceptual map to guide our understanding and actions in the 
global age is much more complex than the previous six maps we 
have examined. On one hand, the state as a unitary actor is seeing 
its central role wane in favour of a disaggregation into sub-state 
authorities with increasing transnational agency (Slaughter, 2003, 
2004). Transnational governing networks are acquiring ever more 
importance: courts; public authorities; inter-parliamentary 
assemblies; and central banks are all increasing their cooperation 
with international counterparts. On the other hand, there is an 
increasing number and range of non-governmental actors 
demanding inclusion in the international decision-making process 
or directly acquiring authority, expertise, and power to influence 
international affairs in parallel to and regardless of state authority. 
From international gatherings such as the World Economic Forum 
to global terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda or Daesh, from the 
philanthropic foundations such as the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation to social movements such as the Movimento Sem 
Terra, to international NGOs such as Greenpeace and Amnesty 
International, to the Tibetan diaspora, from alternative media like 
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Wikileaks to the stars of charitable work like Bono of U2, to the 
think tanks like the Council on Foreign Relation and investment 
banks like JP Morgan Chase, from the rating agencies like 
Standard & Poor’s to the major global media players like CNN, 
and new media like Facebook and Twitter, non-state actors are 
everywhere in global politics (Naìm, 2013). 
 
1.4 Scenarios of globalisation  
In the most fervent hyper-globalist projects, the final step of 
humanity’s evolution coincides with a world system perfectly 
integrated in every way: a single global market, a single legal code 
and a global supreme court, and a single political-institutional 
system. Analytically, as far back as 1969, Deutsch stressed that 
“societal borders dissolve when there is no more critical reduction 
in the frequency of social transaction” (Deutsch, 1969, 99). This is 
the goal numerous hyper-globalists would like to achieve. Are we 
on such a path? The answer is not straightforward. Whereas 
liberals argue that global integration is proceeding gradually but—
at least for some—inexorably, for realists, the phase of integration 
that we are witnessing currently is subject to future change that 
will be shaped by the redistribution of power at the global level. 
Liberals argue that the world in which we live is increasingly 
integrated and that this is generating significant benefits for 
humanity in terms of—in the final analysis—reducing the 
likelihood of armed conflicts. Trade, and economic interaction more 
generally, is constantly rising and because of this, the cost-benefit-
analysed irrationality of war increases. International institutions, 
both those which are classically intergovernmental and other 
hybrid or private institutions of global governance, are 
increasingly more robust and omnipresent. Intrinsic distrust of 
international affairs is diminishing thanks to repeated 
interactions in institutional contexts. Finally, the specific form of 
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democratic government is spreading and this, according to 
democratic peace theory, will lead to the pacification of the 
international environment.  
In parallel to progressive economic integration, we are also 
witnessing the increasing difficulties faced by national political 
structures in tackling new global challenges. The interpretations 
of this phenomenon are numerous: for the most radical, 
globalisation marks the end of the state itself (Ohmae, 1995) or, at 
least, the end of the social democratic era (Scharpf, 1997). Others 
argue we are witnessing a retreat of the state (Strange, 1996) that 
will make it residual (Cerny, 2010), and an impoverishment of 
politics (Narr & Schubert, 1994) due to the so-called global trap 
(Martin & Schumann, 1997). The logic of the global market thus 
creates a state which is completely focused on competition (Hirsch, 
1997), which leads, in turn, to a race to the bottom (Krugman, 
1997).  
Different understandings of the state have been formulated to 
contradict these interpretations. Some still recognise a role for the 
state within the phenomenon of globalisation. Others see global 
transformations as a by-product of the very governmental action of 
the great powers. For the former, the state would, in any case, 
retain significant functions for deciding and implementing public 
policies. National politics would exist to soften the effects of 
integration as a kind of risk insurance, or at least to mediate 
external pressures. Sovereignty would thus be spread across many 
levels and among many institutions, but it would not be 
completely lost, and citizens would still have effective tools to 
determine their own lives. Another more accentuated statist 
perspective is linked to hegemonic stability theory, which sees the 
current state of globalisation as the product of recent decades of 
US hegemony, just as the period of global integration of the end of 
the nineteenth century and the start of the twentieth century were 
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linked to the hegemonic power of the British Empire. Globalisation, 
or globalisations plural, is here a product of hegemon, but states 
which decide, more or less freely, to adopt the political direction of 
the leading country also benefit from bandwagoning. Globalisation, 
in this reading, is animated by an open dynamic, but precisely 
because of this characteristic, experiences tendencies towards 
instability, tension, conflict, and war because of the ambition of 
emerging powers to challenge the hegemon’s leadership. This was 
Germany’s story before World War One and World War Two, and 
this, according to some, is the destiny of the new emerging power, 
China. If this interpretation is correct, the signs of the decline of 
American power suggest a worrying outlook.  
In short, there are six different scenarios for the future of 
globalisation spurring contemporary debate. The first liberal 
scenario sees globalisation as an unstoppable movement, in regard 
to which emerging powers should strategically adapt, ultimately 
by way of Western liberal-democratic values. Globalisation would 
thus be destined for constant growth, albeit not necessarily at an 
increasing pace, and will only reach its end when it has achieved 
complete integration.  
The second liberal scenario forecasts that once a certain 
physical line has been reached, beyond which it is difficult to go, 
globalisation will slow down or even halt, so as not to risk the 
results of the integration achieved so far. A self-controlling socio-
political mechanism that would impose correction on integrationist 
forces would be activated in order to mitigate globalisation’s social 
costs. 
The third scenario, of a more critical liberal nature, is based on 
the idea that the processes of globalisation are not governed and 
thus cannot be stopped voluntarily: they will continue to accelerate 
until the social costs become unsustainable and they will give 
political space, in keeping with a dramatic dynamic of self-
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consumption, to the emergence of nationalist, anti-systemic, or 
regionalist forces which will overturn the logic of integration in 
favour of a return to nationalist barriers and isolationism. 
A fourth realist scenario argues similarly that the future is 
bound towards compartmentalisation. From a geopolitical point of 
view, although it may be true that transatlantic globalisation has 
offered opportunities for political growth and economic 
emancipation to emerging powers, it is, however, increasingly 
evident that this imbalance of power between West and East 
seems to have placed the ability of the system to hold together in 
doubt. It also suggests a return to a compartmentalised logic of a 
multipolar balance of power on a macro-regional basis, with 
potentially conflicting developments.  
The fifth realist scenario argues that the process of 
globalisation will go on, as it has always done, in cyclic waves, with 
ups and downs: a phase of global integration will be followed by a 
phase of nationalist or macro-regional fragmentation, which will 
probably be ended by a conflict setting the basis for the 
construction of another future cycle of expansive globalist 
integration.   
The sixth scenario is constructivist in tone, and presents a less 
well-defined image: it points neither to a shrinking or to a 
preservation of global dynamics, but to their transformation. From 
this perspective, which is related to the idea of multiple 
modernities, the current level of supranational integration will 
take different paths from those that are today imposed by the 
West: this will see the formation of new hybrid modalities inspired 
by previously marginalised non-Western politico-cultural 
traditions. It is in this scenario that the consolidation of emerging 
power status will not necessarily lead to a phase of conflict over a 
new global hegemony, but rather to the formation of differentiated 
areas of development, some of them governed according to 
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principles that are alien to the West. This could lead to a world of 
differentiated capitalism, albeit with features of a single, globally 
decentralised system (Buzan & Lawson, 2014). 
 
1.5 Three world orders 
After reviewing the conceptual maps of international politics 
and the various future scenarios for globalisation, it is now time to 
examine the three main world order arrangements that could 
emerge in the coming decades. These derive from the current 
distribution of power at the international level and from current 
trends, and are extrapolated as possible future developments. 
These eventualities involve the four major powers in the world to 
come: China, the European Union, Russia, and the US. 
The international system will most likely pivot on the 
interaction between the declining hegemon, the US, and the 
emerging power, China. It is with reference to such interaction 
that we need to envisage possible future world orders. It is clear 
that the other remaining powers, not to mention other countries, 
will have to strategically adapt to the behaviour of these two 
superpowers. 
Trends for US power are controversial. A number of authors 
argue that the decline is significant and clear (Layne, 2012). Other 
analysts argue instead that the US is bound to remain the leader 
of the international system for decades to come (Nye, 2012). The 
economic weight of the American economy as a proportion of global 
GPD is not expected to change significantly. Similarly, US political 
and military power will remain very significant. What is changing 
is the diminishing edge the US has enjoyed vis-à-vis other powers. 
While the American economy will constitute slightly more than 
20% of the global economy, other economies will expand and 
actually outgrow their US counterpart. 
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China’s growth is undeniable. Economically, China will become 
the largest economy in the world in the next few years. It already 
has the largest banking asset, the largest import-export gains, and 
is a leader in R&D. Militarily, Chinese growth is significantly 
reducing the gap with its American counterpart year by year. 
Socially and politically, China is becoming a magnet of attraction 
for an increasing number of countries and individuals around the 
world. 
Many see the relative decline of the US and the growth of 
China as setting the two on a collision course (Allison, 2017). It is 
difficult to predict whether a real armed conflict will occur between 
the two superpowers. There are significant balancing dynamics 
between the two countries, first and foremost their economic 
interdependence: the US needs China to buy its treasury bonds, 
and China needs the US to buy its products. What can be affirmed 
more easily is that there will be a continuous, if not growing, 
tension between the two. As outcomes of this tension, three main 
scenarios of world order can be drawn. 
 
World order one : The West vs. the Rest 
In this scenario, tension remains a central feature which 
polarises the world in a new bipolar system. The EU is pulled 
towards, and even more greatly integrated within, the 
transatlantic community, while Russia follows a similar trajectory 
within a Sino-centric Asian community. Tensions increase 
between the US and China but do not reach the point of armed 
conflict. China is not ready yet for a military confrontation. The 
US could be tempted to crash the would-be challenger before it is 
no longer possible, however, a number of parameters suggest that 
any unilateral American military containment may be too late. 
Economic relationships, political groupings, and military alliances 
all tend to be polarised. As a consequence, the two junior partners, 
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the EU and Russia, are bound to align themselves with the two 
great powers. Economic pressure is developed through a revival of 
intra-regional blocs, protectionism, economic geopolitics, economic 
cyber warfare, and technological competition. Political pressure is 
exerted indirectly on minor allies and directly through attempts to 
discredit rivals within their local constituencies. Military 
escalation is visible in an arms race, a corresponding increase in 
the military budgets of the two countries and their allies, and the 
repetition of minor skirmishes in East Asia, especially in the South 
China Sea. 
 
World order two : Eurasian integration and US solitude 
In this scenario, a process of inter-regional integration is 
promoted by China and accepted by both Russia and the EU. The 
Eurasian mass is progressively integrated within the largest 
economic area in the world. All other regional aggregations suffer 
a strong pull effect. The US and the American continent at large 
goes adrift in geopolitical solitude, generating inward-looking 
isolationist stances. The US economy enters a stark decline, the 
country loses political leadership, and the military apparatus gets 
silenced. Domestic politics become fragmented, ethnic issues 
become dominant, and the territorial integrity of the federation is 
challenged with states such as California and Florida demanding 
independence. The tight grip of American global alliances weakens, 
and one after the other, former allies open up channels of 
communication and cooperation with the emerging hegemon. 
China’s power continues to expand, and its attractiveness 
continues to grow. The global narrative changes and becomes 
Sino-centric. A new Pax Sinica, with Chinese political and 
economic principles, is established. Eurasian integration develops 
significantly with promotion from Beijing. First ASEAN and 
African countries, then countries in central Asia, then South Korea, 
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Russia, and Iran all move towards deeper integration with China. 
Finally, the European Union, India, Japan, and the Gulf countries 
all enter the Chinese orbit. The US is isolated and barely manages 
to maintain its few ‘light’ anti-China alliances with individual 
countries in Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. 
 
World order three: Enlarged West vs. China 
In this scenario, the West remains predominant, China 
becomes more and more isolated, and Russia is pulled back 
towards Europe and the larger transatlantic community. The 
enlarged West, now strengthened by the addition of a traditional 
rival, re-establishes its global leadership. China is relegated to the 
role of a regional power with no global ambition. The US is able to 
exert considerable pressure on China such that China actually 
gives up its international ambitions. Economic constraints, 
political pressure, and a number of minor military confrontations 
suffice to deter China from further developing its global ambitions. 
China is internally destabilised by domestic revolts that weaken 
its leadership and challenge its territorial integrity, especially in 
Tibet and Xinjiang. China is thus inhibited and only manages to 
preserve its autonomy on a regional base within East Asia. Under 
these tense circumstances, Russia is persuaded to give up its 
strategic alliance with China and to return to Europe and the 
broader Western world with the status of a junior partner. 
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1.6 Implications for East Asia 
From the three previous scenarios of world order, a number of 
consequences can be derived for the specific political context of 
East Asia. 
In the first scenario, World Order 1: The West vs. the Rest, the 
East Asia region is expected to continue to be splitter among two 
centres of gravity: USA and RPC. While a number of countries will 
remain starkly tied to the US and others starkly tied to RPC, the 
remaining countries will be the object of continuous offering to 
drop the competitor camp. Overall, we expect a significant number 
of countries to become more reliant on, yet not necessarily satisfied 
with, China’s growing hegemonic ambitions in the region. This is 
because within a scenario in which tensions escalate between 
China and the West, and more precisely, with the United States, 
Beijing is expected to further try to consolidate its power and self-
confidence in East Asia with the intent to construct an image of 
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China in the international order as the representative of Asian 
countries and non-Western nations. 
In the last decade, Beijing’s more assertive foreign policy 
allowed China to consolidate its position in Asia, politically and 
economically. Since 2014, China has notably consolidated its 
military position in the South China Sea. Between 2013 and 2015, 
the establishment of new initiatives, such as the AIIB or the Silk 
Road Fund, has grown in parallel with China’s consistent 
engagement with other multilateral initiatives in Asia, i.e., the 
ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP). China, however, has gone much further than simply 
launching or supporting new initiatives in the region. The 
aspirations of Xi Jinping and its administration for China’s 
primary role in East Asia can be reassumed by the concept a 
“community of common destiny of mankind” (more often 
translated into English as a “community of shared future for 
mankind”). The phrase expresses China’s long-term vision for 
making the international environment congenial with its interests 
and governance model, within which countries in Asia stand as 
key players in order to support China to achieve this goal. Xi 
Jinping has embarked into a massive diplomatic mission with 
Asian countries from Cambodia to Laos, from Vietnam to Thailand, 
in order to support its long-term strategy. While promoting the 
Belt and Road initiative as a win-win opportunity to develop and 
consolidate traditional friendship and strategic cooperation among 
countries, Xi Jinping is also building consensus around the fact 
that China might represent the only viable alternative to let the 
XXI century really become the ‘Asian Century’. With countries in 
the north, such as Japan or ROK, China calls for a shared 
responsibility to promote cooperation for regional stability and 
peace. However, even if from an economic point of view promoting 
trade liberalization among the three countries rests a common 
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priority – at the end of 2018 the three countries held the 14th 
round of negotiations on the China-Japan-ROK Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) –Japan and the ROK are not always satisfied by 
Beijing’s greater activism in foreign policy. For instance with 
Japan, disputes in the East China Sea are not set aside and 
notwithstanding the signing of the Japan-China Maritime Search 
and rescue agreement in October 2018, the two countries’ 
sovereignty dispute is still highly complicated.  
In the second scenario, World Order 2: Eurasian integration 
and US solitude, the international relations of East Asia tend to be 
integrated into the wider Eurasian move, though as a secondary 
attachment. In such a vision, China can be expected to demand 
more influence in the international system with its major priorities 
resting mostly focused to the strengthening of its relations with 
Russia and the EU, rather than East Asian countries. While the 
international position of other countries in the region could become 
further jeopardized because of China’s intent to become a global 
leader, this at the same time might open new ‘windows of 
opportunities’ for countries such as Japan or South Korea, and 
regional organizations such as ASEAN in Asia to play greater 
roles in the region. 
Since Xi Jinping took office in 2012, a key strategy to his 
foreign policy has been to envision China as a ‘global actor’ in 
world affairs. More practically, three major priorities concerned Xi 
Jinping’s vision to build China’s role in the XXI century. First and 
foremost, it is Beijing’s long-term vision for transforming the 
international environment to make it compatible with China’s 
governance model and emergence as a global leader. Secondly, it is 
the focus on the establishment of ‘a new type of international 
relations’ that supports, rather than threatens, China’s national 
rejuvenation. Last, but not least, is the fact that Xi Jinping has 
made a crucial progression from his predecessors’ rhetoric (from 
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Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao), proposing China to ‘take an active 
part in leading the global governance system’ (Tobin 2018). Within 
such a context, East Asia is not a main or the sole priority of 
China’s foreign policy. 
Amid uncertainty in the light of a consistent ‘pivot to Eurasia’ by 
China, Japan, for instance, could become a crucial actor on the 
regional stage. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s role in Asia 
has been challenged by China’s rise. Nonetheless, Japan has so far 
managed to continue to strengthen its role in Asia: by creating 
strategic partnerships with Australia and India; by leading a 
multilateral trade negotiation, the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 
following the failure of the original project, the TPP, and the US 
withdrawal. In this scenario, further cooperation between Japan 
and South Korea rests a common priority.  
In the third scenario, World Order 3: Enlarged West vs. China, 
East Asia appears more supportive of what could still be defined 
as a Western-led international order, notwithstanding China’s 
regionally circumscribed power. If China abandons or fails its 
global ambitions, regional-only priorities guide its foreign policy. 
These could not be driven by hegemonic intents, rather by security 
and economic priorities: internal turmoil and Party’s survival 
along with the continuing decline of Chinese economic growth 
could be the main interests of future generation leaders in power. 
In this scenario, Japan and South Korea still maintain their role 
as key allies of the United States in Asia and the Pacific. 
Furthermore, with a less-ambitious China, ASEAN’s position in 
Asia is also expected to change. Since the 1990s, ASEAN’s role has 
been particularly successful in leading multilateral initiatives in 
the region, i.e., ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN+3, the Chiang 
Mai Initiative, etc. However, the majority of these initiatives have 
been developed in the shadow of a rising China and its growing 
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hegemonic role. The multilateral organization, founded in 1967 
with the aim to counter-balance the communist threats in the 
region, could finally sit in the ‘driver’s seat’ and play a leadership 
role in East Asia without worries of seeing its interests and 
initiatives overshadowed by an increasingly assertive China. 
 
1.7 Conclusions 
The world is entering a phase of significant geopolitical shifts. 
With the end of the Western world order that has dominated the 
last three decades, the international scene has become more 
pluralist and complex. Traditional American leadership is 
challenged by a number of increasingly powerful competitors who 
have growing international ambitions. We argue that four main 
actors will play the game of global politics: China, the European 
Union, Russia, and the US. 
In this would-be multipolar order, the strategic dynamics 
would be sophisticated, more difficult to predict than at present, 
and more unstable. Give the presence of these four actors and 
given current trends, three main world order scenarios can 
potentially come to pass: the West vs. the Rest; Eurasia vs. the US; 
and the enlarged West vs. China. These have varying degrees of 
probability. From an analytical point of view, consideration of each 
eventuality is crucial in order to develop strategic thinking for the 
future. In this light, the East Asia region rests a vital context 
through which to analyse future scenarios of world orders. It is 
true that China’s growing hegemonic position in the region could 
overshadow some countries’ role in Asia. However, to what extent 
China’s interests are driven largely by regional intents seem hard 
to predict. Xi Jinping’ ambitions for a ‘Global China’ are 
strengthening interregional integration processes and particularly, 
Eurasian integration. In such a scenario, Asia is not yet ‘ripe for 
rivalry’ (Friedberg 1993). Rather, with the declining US in the 
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West, the real competition concerns the Eurasian region, which 
necessarily would have to deal with an alternative development 
model, but for many, still not suitable outside China’s borders. To 
some extent, China has not yet found its ‘place in the sun’ vis-à-vis 
the current world order. The emergence of a global China will help 
East Asia obtain a key role in the global society.  
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